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Abstract  24 
The effectiveness of animal health surveillance systems depends on their capacity to gather sanitary 25 
information from the animal production sector. In order to assess this capacity we analyzed the flow 26 
of sanitary information regarding Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) suspicions in poultry in 27 
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Vietnam. Participatory methods were applied to assess the type of actors and likelihood of 28 
information sharing between actors in case of HPAI suspicion in poultry.  29 
While the reporting of HPAI suspicions is mandatory, private actors had more access to information 30 
than public actors. Actors of the upstream sector (medicine and feed sellers) played a key role in the 31 
diffusion of information. 32 
The central role of these actors and the influence of the information flow on the adoption by poultry 33 
production stakeholders of behaviors limiting (e.g. prevention measures) or promoting disease 34 
transmission (e.g. increased animal movements) should be accounted for in the design of surveillance 35 
and control programs. 36 
Keywords 37 
Disease Reporting; Social Networks; Vietnam; H5N1 virus; Private Sector; Participatory Research; 38 
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Abbreviations  40 
HPAI: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 41 
PP: Proportional Piling 42 
1. Introduction  43 
The performance of public surveillance systems depends on their ability to access health information 44 
from the animal husbandry sector. Therefore, among the requirements for effective surveillance 45 
networks, the acceptability of the system (i.e. willingness of actors to participate in the system) is of 46 
particular importance (Hoinville, 2011). 47 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus (HPAI) (H5N1) is present in Vietnam since the first 48 
epizootic in 2003. Notification of any HPAI (H5N1) suspicions to veterinary authorities is mandatory 49 
(MARD and MOH, 2011). The case definition of HPAI (H5N1) suspicion in poultry is based on a 5% 50 
mortality in one poultry flock over 2 days along with specific symptoms such as cyanosis, swelling of 51 
the head and diarrhea (Department of Animal Health, 2011). This case definition is common with 52 
velogenic Newcastle Disease also circulating in Vietnam (OIE, 2014). Despite strong coverage of 53 
veterinary authorities in the field at all levels (village , commune, district and province), under-54 
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reporting of HPAI suspicions has been recognized by the authorities as a major limitation in the 55 
effectiveness of any HPAI (H5N1) control programs in place (Minh et al., 2011). 56 
In order to ensure acceptability and sustainability of the surveillance and control programs, 57 
accounting for the needs of all stakeholders becomes critical. In order to do so, a good understanding 58 
of health information sharing pathways between stakeholders is essential. Network analysis has been 59 
widely applied to study complex socio-economic interactions such as the spread of influence and 60 
knowledge (Jackson, 2008; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In the field of animal health, this method 61 
has been mainly used to identify actors contributing the most to the spread of contagious diseases 62 
through live animal trading networks (Fournie et al., 2013; Rasamoelina-Andriamanivo et al., 2014; 63 
Vallee et al., 2013). Participatory Epidemiology methods proved efficient in gathering reliable 64 
information while addressing questions related to the perception of local actors on animal disease 65 
issues (Catley et al., 2012). 66 
The aim of this study was to apply network analysis approach to understand the information sharing 67 
network in case of HPAI (H5N1) suspicion. A participatory epidemiology approach was implemented 68 
to identify the main actors involved in the information sharing networks of HPAI (H5N1) suspicions 69 
in Vietnam and to investigate the patterns of information sharing between the actors. 70 
2. Material and Methods 71 
2.1. Study areas.  72 
Rural communes from two Provinces of Vietnam were selected according to their HPAI (H5N1) risk 73 
level and poultry production characteristics: Hải Dương province, in the Red river delta, Northern 74 
Vietnam, was classified as high risk by the Department of Animal Health of Vietnam and with high 75 
density of semi-commercial chicken broiler farms (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2012). Đồng 76 
Nai province, in Southeast Vietnam, was classified as low risk and with numerous large-scale duck 77 
and chicken broiler commercial farms. 78 
2.2. Sampling frame 79 
In each study area, participants were contacted with the help of veterinary authorities and commune or 80 
village officials. Focus group interviews were conducted with poultry farmers belonging to different 81 
production types present in the study area: backyard poultry farmers (flock size: <100 animals), small 82 
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broiler chicken farmers (flock size: 100-1000 animals), large broiler chicken farmers (flock size: 83 
>1000 animals), large broiler duck farmers (flock size: >1000 animals). This first step aimed at 84 
investigating the information delivered by farmers in case of HPAI suspicions in their farms. Each 85 
focus group comprised 7 to 20 farmers of the same production type. Then other categories of actors 86 
where progressively included in the sample using the snowball sampling approach (Sadler et al., 87 
2010). New categories of actors mentioned by the participants were included in the sampling. For 88 
each new category of actor, participants were asked to mention names of individuals they considered 89 
critical contacts. Then these critical contacts were asked for an interview. Individual interviews of 90 
selected poultry farmers (n=4 per focus group) were also performed. Some of the selected critical 91 
contacts refused to be interviewed, the proportion of refusals varying from 0 to 40%. Critical contacts 92 
who refused the interviews were replaced by other actors of the same category, practicing their 93 
activity in the same area. 94 
2.3. Data collection 95 
Data were collected by teams of 2 to 5 researchers and veterinary students. Interview team members 96 
were previously trained using participatory epidemiology approaches. 97 
In the first phase of the study, semi-structured interviews and proportional piling (PP) (Mariner and 98 
Paskin, 2000) were conducted with focus groups of poultry farmers to identify the names of the 99 
poultry diseases that farmers perceived as causing the highest and quickest mortality in poultry flocks. 100 
Proportional piling consisted in asking participants to draw circle corresponding to items like disease 101 
names and distributing 100 counters in each circle (according to rate of mortality and rapidity of the 102 
disease).  Participants were then asked an estimate of the rate of mortality and duration of diseases 103 
which were given the highest scores. Disease names participants associated with at least 50% 104 
mortality in poultry flocks in less than 5 days were used to refer to HPAI (H5N1) suspicions in 105 
subsequent interviews. Using the disease suspicion definition, participants were asked to identify the 106 
different types of actors they exchanged information with when this event occurred. The relative 107 
likelihood of information exchanges was quantified using PP technique: participants were asked to 108 
distribute 100 counters within circles representing the different categories of actors they had 109 
previously listed. Participants were also asked the reasons of the information exchanges and the 110 
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differences in priority given to each one. They also were asked if they were interested in receiving 111 
such information and if so the reason why they considered such information useful. In the northern 112 
study area, individually interviewed participants were also asked the names and location of the 113 
individuals they shared information with. In the southern study area, they were also asked to estimate 114 
the number of day between the time they would get the information and the time they would transmit 115 
it. 116 
2.4. Data analysis. 117 
Directed weighted networks were built using categories of actors as nodes and exchanges of 118 
information about suspicions as links between nodes (Jackson, 2008). Links were weighted according 119 
to the results of the PP on the relative probabilities of information sharing between the different 120 
categories of actors. The category which received the highest score was considered to be contacted 121 
with certainty whereas the others were given relatively less priority. All scores were divided by the 122 
highest score, such that the category which ranked first then had a score p of 1, and other categories 123 
had a score ranging from 0 to 1. 124 
Several individuals or groups of individuals from a given category were separately interviewed, 125 
generating several estimations of the relative probability of information-sharing between 2 given 126 
categories of actors. These variations in the estimation of each probability were taken into account by 127 
building all possible resulting adjacency matrices and calculating all possible resulting measures of 128 
centrality. 129 
Two types of links were considered: i) the transmission of information by a given farmer on disease 130 
suspicions happening in his farm (primary information), this information was considered of good 131 
quality, and ii) the transmission of information from a given actor on disease suspicions happening in 132 
other farms (secondary information), which was considered of lower quality (loss of precision). 133 
In order to take into consideration both types of links, Bonacich’s alpha centrality measure was used 134 
as an indicator of the quantity of information each category of actor could obtain when a disease 135 
suspicion occurred (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001). The Alpha centralities correspond to the solution to 136 
the following matrix equation: 137 
              
6 
 
   is the transpose of the adjacency matrix   which only accounts for secondary exchanges.   is the 138 
vector of alpha centralities of the network’s nodes;   is the vector of exogenous influences on nodes 139 
of the network that do not depend on the structure of the network and   is a parameter that 140 
corresponds to the relative importance of the network topology. 141 
It was assumed that each node   had exogenous sources of information    that directly came from 142 
owners of affected farms. In other words, each value    was the indegree of the node   when only 143 
primary information delivered by affected farms was considered and   was the vector of all values    144 
of the nodes. The considered links of the network were the secondary information exchanges. 145 
The value of   was chosen to be as high as possible while satisfying           , where      is 146 
the highest eigenvalues of all simulated adjacency matrices (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001). We chose 147 
      .  148 
2.5. Computing material 149 
Data analysis was performed using R.2.15.3 software (R core team, 2014). Network graphs were built 150 
and alpha centralities were calculated using the igraph package (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006). Graphical 151 
displays of quantitative outputs were made using ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2009). Spatial 152 
representations were made using ArcMap 10.2 software (ESRI, 2011). 153 
3. Results 154 
3.1. Sample size 155 
Overall, the study sample included 158 participants (North: n=94, South: n=64) from 9 categories: 156 
backyard poultry farmers (flock size: <100 animals)  (North: n=40, South: n=20), small broiler 157 
chicken farmers (flock size : 100-1000 animals) (North: n=20), large broiler chicken farmers (flock 158 
size: >1000 animals) (North: n=10, South: n=17), large broiler duck farmers (flock size: >1000 159 
animals) (South: n=10), government veterinarians (North: n=6, South: n=4) , feed and chick sellers 160 
(North: n=5, South: n=1), veterinary medicine sellers (North: n=2, South: n=4), poultry traders 161 
(North: n=3, South: n=3),  veterinary technicians of feed companies (North: n=5, South: n=3) and 162 
pharmaceutical companies (North: n=3, South: n=2). 163 
3.2. Adopted disease suspicion definition 164 
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Poultry farmers mentioned several diseases names causing high mortality in a relatively short time. 165 
The adopted disease suspicion definition was defined as more than 50% mortality in one flock in less 166 
than 5 days. English translations of disease names which matched this definition were “Newcastle 167 
Disease”, “Gumboro Disease”, “Plague”, ”Black head disease”, “Epidemic disease” and “Fowl 168 
cholera” (in the northern study area), “Newcastle Disease”, “Gumboro disease” and “Flu” (in the 169 
southern study area). One of these disease names was used to refer to disease suspicions. 170 
3.3. Private actors were the first targets of information sharing on HPAI like disease suspicions 171 
Contacts with actors of the upstream sector (feed-chick sellers, veterinary shops or feed company 172 
technicians) were given the highest priority by farmers in case of suspicion   in their farms (Figure 1). 173 
However, alpha centrality measures accounting for both primary and secondary information flows 174 
showed that other poultry farmers received equal or more information than the other categories 175 
(Figure 2). Indeed, actors of the upstream sector mentioned they would warn other poultry farmers of 176 
the occurrence of high mortality events in order to protect their customers’ income and business 177 
capacities, so they could continue to buy their products and repay their debts. Even though 178 
government veterinarians received poultry health information, mainly from veterinary shops, the 179 
official surveillance system appeared as peripheral in the information-sharing network dominated by 180 
private actors (Figures 1 and 2). Connections between veterinary shops and government veterinarians 181 
were commonly observed in both study areas, as several government veterinarians had also a private 182 
medicine selling activity. 183 
 184 
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Figure 1. Information-sharing networks of HPAI (H5N1) suspicion information identified in the two 186 
study areas. Colored nodes represent categories of actors. Arrows represent the directed information 187 
exchanges operated by actors of each category with other actors. Arrow widths represent the means of 188 
the relative probabilities of these exchanges. Black arrows represent the information flows from 189 
affected farmers (bottom dark green circles). Grey arrows represent the secondary information flows 190 
(occurring between other actors) (2 column-fitting image, color reproduction on the web only). 191 
3.4. Information sharing differed between study areas and scale of poultry production 192 
Veterinary shops had a relatively higher centrality in the network in the South Vietnam study area 193 
whereas feed-chick sellers were more central in the North (Figures 1, 2). The high concentration of 194 
large scale farms in Đồng Nai province (South) was associated with the implementation of veterinary 195 
shops and an easy access to these shops by all farmers. In the North Vietnam study area, feed-chick 196 
sellers also supplied medicines directly to the farm whereas veterinary shops were at distant location 197 
from the farms (more than 3 kilometers) (Figure 3). As a result backyard and small scale commercial 198 
farms contacted more feed-chick sellers than veterinary shops, whereas large scale commercial farms 199 
contacted more veterinary shops, in order to get a better service (owners of veterinary shops were 200 
graduated veterinarians). Broiler duck farmers participating in the South Vietnam study area were 201 
more likely to contact feed companies because of the existence of production contracts linking them. 202 
 203 
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204 
Figure 2. Box-and-whisker plots of alpha centrality measures of categories of actors, when both 205 
primary and secondary information flows are taken into account. These results were computed from 206 
the weighted directed networks of categories designed from the participatory investigations. Different 207 
results are displayed according to the primary source of information (production type of affected 208 
farm) and the study area (North and South) (2 column-fitting image, color reproduction on the web 209 
only). 210 
3.5. Actors of the upstream poultry sector propagated the information to distant places 211 
Results of individual and group interviews showed that more than 79.0 % of information sharing 212 
between poultry farmers was between individuals from the same village (Figure 3). In contrast, feed-213 
chick sellers and veterinary shops exchanged information mostly with actors located in other villages 214 
or other communes (respectively 62.8% and 100%) (Figure 3). Feed-chick sellers and poultry farmers 215 
spread information to farmers located in nearby communes, on distances reaching about 5 km, while 216 
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owners of veterinary shops spread information to customers located in several different districts, or 217 
several different provinces, on distances of about 50 km (Figure 4). Besides, technicians of 218 
pharmaceutical or feed companies visited customers located in areas comprising one to several 219 
provinces and companies had technicians located in a large part of the country. They all said they 220 
transmitted information on disease suspicions on such distance. 221 
 222 
223 
Figure 3. Spatial representation of the information flows occurring between private actors (poultry 224 
farmers, feed-chick sellers, veterinary shops) individually interviewed in the northern study area (2 225 
column-fitting image, color reproduction on the web only). 226 
 227 
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228 
Figure 4. Spatial representation of the areas where poultry farmers receive information from 229 
interviewed poultry farmers, feed-chick sellers and veterinary shops of the northern study area (2 230 
column-fitting image, color reproduction on the web only). 231 
3.6. Timeliness of information sharing 232 
In the South study area, poultry farmers said they reported the disease suspicion information to the 233 
veterinary shops within the same day they observed the symptoms in their farms. Time of primary 234 
exchanges with other actors varied between 1 day and 1 week after observation of the symptoms. 235 
Times of secondary information exchanges varied between 1 day and 1 month after the moment each 236 
actor received the information. Actors of the upstream sector (Feed-chick sellers, owners of veterinary 237 
shops, technicians of companies) said they shared the information with poultry farmers everyday 238 
whenever they met them.  239 
3.7. Usefulness of information   240 
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In both study areas, all the actors showed an interest in getting information on disease suspicions. 241 
Farmers used it to anticipate disease occurrence and its possible impact on poultry market prices. 242 
They had three types of reactions: i) preventive measures could be implemented (with vaccination, 243 
disinfection, antibiotics and isolation of animals in the northern study area, vaccination and 244 
disinfection in the southern study area); ii) early sale of animals could be done before the disease 245 
occurs in their farm and/or the poultry prices decrease, or iii) a speculation strategy (stocking of 246 
young animals to sell them after the epizootic, when the prices are high due to a shortage of poultry). 247 
Actors of the upstream sector used information to anticipate adverse effects of disease on their sales 248 
and to anticipate market price variation. Poultry traders used information as an advantage in price 249 
negotiation with poultry producers. 250 
4. Discussion  251 
4.1. Relevance of the method for assessing information sharing processes   252 
The data collection was based on the likelihood of information exchanges perceived by actors of 253 
poultry production. Another approach could have been based on the accounting of these information 254 
exchanges according to each actor’s past memory. However, information flows on disease outbreaks 255 
are difficult to quantify for two reasons: opposite to information on animal sales or purchases, there is 256 
no records of poultry health information exchanges linked to social contacts. Then, as diseases occur 257 
on an irregular basis, participants may have experienced such events at different time point before the 258 
study, which would have added more heterogeneity between actors. Indeed recall biases can be high, 259 
which would limit the validity of the data collected. Semi-quantification of the priority given to each 260 
information sharing pathway by the participants was easier to implement and provided more accurate 261 
data. Indeed it provides insight into what would happen in an actual HPAI suspicion situation, based 262 
on each participant’s own rational.  263 
Snowball sampling was also appropriate for this type of research. It enabled to draw an exhaustive list 264 
of categories of actors involved in the information sharing process (Sadler et al., 2010). 265 
4.2. Limitations of the study 266 
The main limitation of the study is its limited scale (several rural communes in one northern and one 267 
southern province). However, using snowball sampling, individuals who were targeted by information 268 
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flows and who were located outside the study area also were included in the sample. Such approach 269 
enables to analyze how information is disseminated from one poultry production area to the others 270 
depending on the type of poultry production and the actors involved. 271 
4.3. Building bridges with the private sector: where to begin? 272 
Our results showed the central role of private actors in the HPAI suspicions information sharing in 273 
Vietnam. It confirmed previous sociological studies which emphasized the need for public veterinary 274 
surveillance systems to establish bridges with the private sector (Desvaux and Figuie, 2011). However 275 
our study also demonstrated the importance of understanding the processes of those private networks 276 
as the type of actors involved differ according to the poultry production sector characteristics and 277 
therefore the geographic location. In areas with high development of industrial and commercial 278 
poultry production, veterinary shops operated by private veterinarians are accessible to smallholder 279 
farms. However in areas with relatively lower development of industrial and commercial production, 280 
veterinary shops are less accessible and actors in close and regular contact with poultry farmers (feed 281 
or chick sellers) provide veterinary services themselves.  282 
These local actors are the main route of transmission of disease suspicion information to distant areas. 283 
A major part of the Vietnamese poultry production is made in small-scale farming systems and most 284 
farmers cannot afford constant investments in biosecurity and prevention measures (Agrifood 285 
Consulting International, 2006; General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2012). Information on disease 286 
suspicions is especially useful for such farmers who can adapt their preventive measures according to 287 
the type of information received. So far, only actors of the upstream sector seemed to adequately 288 
address these needs. They should be the main targets of programs aimed at diversifying information 289 
sources of public surveillance systems, using, for example, participatory surveillance (Mariner et al., 290 
2014) or syndromic surveillance (Dorea et al., 2011). Indeed, these actors can provide information on 291 
the sanitary situation of numerous farms of their area of activity to the public surveillance system. 292 
This information which could be used in guiding deeper investigation of poultry flocks and early 293 
detection of HPAI (H5N1) outbreaks. 294 
4.4. Relevance of the study results for HPAI control interventions 295 
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Poultry farmers were more likely to obtain information on disease suspicions compared to 296 
government veterinarians and they had a rapid access to this information. This result has strong 297 
implication in term of disease control measures. Since 2012 control measures implemented against 298 
HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in Vietnam have focused on destruction of infected flocks, disinfection and 299 
poultry movement restrictions in confirmed affected areas (NSCAI, 2012). However, farmers tend to 300 
quickly sell their adult animals or purchase young animals when facing an epizootic threat. Therefore 301 
peaks in animal movements directly follow HPAI suspicion occurrences, while veterinary authorities 302 
are not yet aware of the situation. This increase in animal movements might generate additional 303 
adverse effects for the poultry production: increased risk of disease spread and drop in market sale 304 
prices. Special programs (through financial incentives or educational campaigns) could be 305 
implemented to encourage farmers to quarantine rather than sell animals when information on disease 306 
suspicions is shared in their neighborhood. 307 
5. Conclusion 308 
Our study showed that information on HPAI (H5N1) disease suspicions in Vietnam is mainly 309 
mediated by private actors who enhanced other poultry farmers’ awareness about potential disease 310 
occurrences. Despite their strong presence in the field, the connection between this private network 311 
and veterinary authorities seemed limited. Our results confirmed the need to build bridges between 312 
public surveillance and local private actors and highlight the importance of actors from the upstream 313 
sector i.e. medicine and feed sellers. Positive and negative effects of information spread also need to 314 
be accounted in disease control programs.  315 
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